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Abstract
The paper analyzes the welfare consequences of insuring mortality risk by
means of standard, fully funded Social Security pensions when individuals wish
to make transfers to their heirs. In the presence of uninsured mortality risk,
within-family transfers depend on realized lifespan. While crowding out private
transfers, Social Security provides transfer insurance and insurance of the ex
ante risk of future generations inheriting a particular amount of transfer wealth.
We find that, once ex ante insurance is taken into account, Social Security is
welfare improving over the long-run as long as capital is not too productive and
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than egoists.
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread use of Social Security pensions all around the world. Already in
the late 1980’s, the number of countries that ran some kind of old-age Social Security
programme was 130, albeit of different size and coverage (see Sala-I-Martin, 1996). A
common argument against Social Security pensions is that they reduce the national
capital stock. Since capital is involved in the aggregate production process and its
reduction will lead to less resources available in the future, Social Security pensions are
seen as welfare-decreasing in the long-run, especially if financed on a pay-as-you-go1
basis (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987). Recent pension policies intend to bring in more
funded elements into Social Security pensions. This paper investigates the welfare
consequences of insuring mortality risk by means of fully funded Social Security. For
example, the German system, the oldest formal Social Security pension system, started
as a fully funded disability system in 1889, and was converted to a pay-as-you-go system
only in the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II. Chile is a prominent
current example of a pension system with substantial reliance on funding. Countries
like Japan and the Netherlands also have had fully funded pension systems for decades.
In aggregate, fully funded Social Security invests the contributions of a generation
at the going interest rate and pays the proceeds plus the assets of those who die pre-
maturely to the survivors of the same generation when old. Several empirical studies
document a substantial reduction in bequest flows and capital (see, e.g., Auerbach
et al., 1995). Two aspects of insurance that arise from premature death are of par-
ticular interest when individuals desire to make transfers to their heirs. First, Social
Security provides intergenerational transfer insurance by smoothing transfers across
states. Second, while death is certain, its timing is not, and those who die prematurely
typically do so with some amount of wealth when they have made private savings to
provide for their old age. Since the assets of the deceased are naturally transferred
within their respective families, intragenerational inequality in wealth arises, so mor-
tality among parents generates the ex ante risk of their children inheriting a particular
amount of wealth. Due to the scheme’s transfer insurance property, future genera-
tions face a more concentrated (or even degenerate) wealth distribution. Risk-averse
individuals value the reduction in ex ante risk.
In this paper, capital reduction and insurance effects are combined in a simple dy-
namic overlapping generations model, wherein individuals live for at most two periods,
facing a positive probability of dying just before reaching retirement in the second
period. Intergenerational transfers occur within families, due to both premature death
and individuals’ desire to make positive inter-vivos transfers. While fully funded Social
Security leads to a reduction in the long-run capital stock, we find that, once insurance
is taken into account, the reduction of capital and long-run welfare gains are not mutu-
ally exclusive, whereby the reduction in capital is related to premature mortality. The
point of departure is selfish behaviour, in the sense that bequest insurance provides
1If Social Security is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, then the contributions of current workers fi-
nance pension benefits of current retirees. In contrast to the funded scheme studied here, contributions
substitute for private savings without adding to the national capital stock.
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no marginal utility, but the scheme promises a higher effective rate of return than the
market.
The paper relates to the literature on the long-run consequences from annuitization
by means of private markets (Kingston and Piggott, 1999 and Fehr and Habermann,
2008), and by means of Social Security (Hubbard and Judd, 1987, and most recently
Caliendo et al., 2014). The main feature of this strand of the literature is the restriction
to the life-cycle savings motive to finance old age consumption, coupled with a lump-
sum redistribution of the assets of the deceased to all members of the next generation.
The long-run welfare effect of Social Security pensions may be summarized in terms
of two income effects. The first stems from a reduction of bequests, the second from
the pension payment in old age. With a zero interest rate, both effects exactly cancel
out in the long-run so that the introduction of a fully funded Social Security pension
system leaves welfare unaffected in the long-run. Moreover, if the previous pension
policy is revisable, then the pension system provides a higher effective rate of return
than the market interest rate: The induced substitution effect is welfare improving
in the long-run. This paper contributes to this literature by lifting the restriction
to a lump-sum redistribution and studying the pension system’s role in reducing the
ex ante risks to lifetime income. We build on early works on within-family transfers
in the absence of a bequest motive of Abel (1985) and Eckstein et al. (1985). To
the author’s best knowledge, only the appendix of Caliendo et al. (2014) provides a
more recent treatment of within-family transfers in the pension context.2 Our setup
allows a generalization of Abel’s (1985) model to the case where individuals have an
operative bequest motive. In light of the very thin private annuities markets (see,
e.g., Pashchenko, 2013) a thorough evaluation of Social Security should account for
the system’s capability to insure risks associated with premature mortality. However,
previous studies with an operative bequest motive either assume that intragenerational
heterogeneity does not arise (see, e.g., Sheshinski andWeiss, 1981 and Lockwood, 2012),
or that private markets in annuities are available (see, e.g., Abel, 1986). We contribute
to this literature by characterizing the long-run distribution of lifetime income in the
presence of uninsured mortality risk and establishing allocative effects of the scheme
relative to the world without it. We also quantify the ex ante welfare gain associated
with the introduction of a fully funded Social Security pension system.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3
establishes the welfare-dominance of Social Security over laissez-faire when individuals
are perfectly selfish. The dynamics and long-run equilibria of the altruistic economy
with and without Social Security are derived in Section 4. Rough calculations in
Section 5 suggest that Social Security is also welfare improving over the long-run in
an economy populated by altruistic individuals as long as capital is not too productive
and the desire to make transfers to the heir is not too strong. A decomposition of the
overall welfare effect into capital reduction and insurance gains is also provided. The
main conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
2Bell and Gersbach (2013) study the impact of uninsured mortality risk on human capital forma-
tion. In their model, transfers are purely inter vivos, but individuals have two parents, which is an
additional source of inequality.
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2 The model economy
The demographic and economic environment is similar to the one used in Abel (1985),
albeit the inclusion of an operative bequest motive requires a slighty more general
description of the mortality process. Moreover, we have to distinguish transfers between
the living (inter-vivos) from transfers that occur after death from the deceased to the
living (bequest). We simply use the term transfer when both kinds of transfers are
possible. Note that either the one or the other transfer occurs.
2.1 The demographic environment
The economy is populated in each period by two overlapping generations whose mem-
bers live for at most two periods, namely, one young generation of workers and one old
generation of retirees. There is a positive probability, q, of dying at the very end of the
first period. At time t = 0, let there be a continuum of individuals indexed by j ∈ [0, 1],
all of whose parents survived to old age. All lineages stem from individuals born in
t = 0. Each young individual gives birth (by parthenogenesis) to just one child prior to
the realisation of the states premature death and survival. From then onwards, prema-
ture mortality sorts individuals into those whose parents survived both periods of life
and those whose parents died prematurely. Let the state a member of lineage j is born
into at any t be denoted by Ijt ∈ I := {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 indicate survival and prema-
ture death of the individual’s parent, respectively. The lineage’s particular mortality
history up to and including period t is denoted by ςjt ∈ I0 × I1 × · · · × It ≡ I
t. By
assumption there is no aggregate uncertainty with regard to the number of premature
deaths per generation.
2.2 The economic environment
There is a single commodity which can be either consumed or saved. Aggregate output,
Y , is produced at the very beginning of each period by means of a production technology
that is linear in both capital and labour. In per worker terms,
Yt = F (1, Kt) = w +R×Kt, (1)
where Kt represents the aggregate capital stock at t. Capital has a lifetime of one
period, so that Kt equals national savings in t− 1. Note that (1) exhibits the property
that capital and labour are perfect substitutes, with constant returns to scale. While
the latter is standard in the literature, the former is very strong. Note however, that
key features of the model, like the optimal size of the scheme, are unaffected by this
assumption. Since factors are paid their respective marginal products, saving one
unit of the good today yields R units in the next period. We say that capital is
unproductive if R = 1. Due to linearity of the production function, factor prices are
given and deterministic.
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There is no private mechanism to pool individual mortality risk. In particular,
private annuities markets are assumed to be absent3. The proceeds from savings of
those who die prematurely are transferred to their respective direct descendants.
2.3 Preferences
All individuals have identical tastes. They derive utility from consumption in youth
and old age, denoted by cjt and c
j
t+1, respectively. They also draw utility from inter-
vivos transfers, bj,0t+1, and bequests in case of premature death, b
j,1
t+1, if these motives
are operative. The superscripts 0 and 1 refer to the states survival I0t and premature
death I10 , respectively. Intergenerational transfers stem from own previous savings, a
j
t ,
and are transferred with interest.
Formally, j’s preferences are represented by
U jt = u(c
j
t) + β(1− q)
[
u(cj,0t+1) + ν(b
j,0
t+1)
]
+ βqν
(
bj,1t+1
)
(2)
Pure impatience is captured by 0 < β ≤ 1.4 Effective discounting is a mixture of
impatience and mortality. The function ν represents the felicity yielded by giving.
The felicity functions u(·) and ν(·) are assumed to be strictly concave. Felicity from
consumption in case of premature death is normalized to zero. Pathological behaviour
is ruled out by the assumption u(x) > ν(x), ∀x. The latter condition simply states that
an individual who saved x/R units to old age prefers life to death even if the transfer
motive is not strong enough to generate positive inter-vivos transfers. The transfer
motive is operative if ν(·) > 0.
Note that the preferences differ conceptionally from ‘pure’ altruism a` la Barro (1974)
and Weil (1987) where individuals care about the utility of their offspring, in fact, the
well-being of all future generations to come5. Here, transfers are motivated by the joy-
of-giving, so that the individual draws utility directly from the transfers they make,
pleasurable or when premature death aﬄicts them, but the pleasure does not depend
on his children’s utility gain (nor on the utility gain of any future generations of the
same lineage that appear on the scene after their direct descendants). This kind of
bequest motive is used by Abel (1986) and, more recently, Lockwood (2012). While
this may look like selfish behaviour at first glance, the preferences defined above may
be interpreted as the preferences of an individual who is concerned with the expected
initial net wealth position of his offspring, where ν(·) is the associated utility index.
Also note that the preferences defined in (2) implicitly impose risk neutrality with
3This assumption is also found in Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), Hubbard and Judd (1987) and
Caliendo et al. (2014).
4Time preference is commonly measured as the marginal rate of substitution between young and
old age consumption along a constant consumption path. With the time-additive preferences used
here, β is just built in and invariant to consumption levels.
5This imposes a very strong assumption on the individual’s capacity to form rational expectations
about the decisions of succesive generations, and on the compatibility of their expectations with those
of their heirs.
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respect to lifetime risk6.
2.4 Fully funded Social Security pensions
Under fully funded Social Security Pensions, contributions are proportional to wages
and are invested at the going market interest rate and paid as pension benefits to the
surviving members of the same generation one period later. The scheme pools the risks
of premature mortality: the pension claims of those who die prematurely are divided
among the survivors of the same generation. In the happy event that individual j,
born in the beginning of period t, survives into old age, she will receive ajtR from her
privately placed savings ajt , and
τ jt wR + τ
j
t
q
1− q
wR
from the pension scheme, where τ jt denotes period-t contribution rate for individual j.
Note that the second term captures the effect of pooling on old age income. The latter
is [
ajt + τ
j
t w/(1− q)
]
R. (3)
If she dies prematurely, then her heir will receive only ajtR as bequest. Note that private
savings and Social Security pensions are not perfect substitutes: While saving one unit
conventionally yields R units in the next period, whether the indiviudal survives or
not, the scheme promises a higher rate of return on contributions, R/(1− q), when the
individual survives, and pays nothing when she dies prematurely. The pension claim
is a state-dependent, i.e. risky, asset that can be used to equalize bequest streams
across states. Also note that the scheme is actuarially fair, so that the expected return
(including the death case) of the individual’s portfolio is unaffected by the scheme.
Since the scheme is fully funded, the contributions to the scheme add to the next
period’s capital stock, so Kt+1 = R×
∫ 1
0
(
ajt + τ
j
t w
)
dj.
We analyse two cases. First, individuals treat the pension policy as given. Second,
each generation can freely decide on the contribution rate. In the latter case, we
consider a string of consecutive generations, each member j ∈ [0, 1] of which chooses the
contribution rate so as to maximize her expected utility. This assumption is plausible
in a two-period setting.
6In fact, the preferences defined in (2) are a special case of
U
j
t = (1− q)φ
[
u(cjt+1) + ν(b
j
t+1)
]
+ qφ
[
ν(w(1− τ jt ) + b
j
t )
]
where the curvature of φ capture individual’s lifetime risk aversion (see Kihlstrom and Mirman,
1974). Bommier (2013) shows that only an exponential form of φ is compatible with time-consistent
preferences when individuals live for more than two periods. Since φ is assumed linear in this paper,
(2) defines preferences of an individual who is risk neutral with respect to mortality risk.
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3 The egoistic economy
This section studies the case of perfectly selfish individuals. Set ν(·) = 0 so that the
proceeds from saving generate no marginal utility when the individual dies prematurely,
be they transferred to the next generation or to the survivors of the same generation.7
Obviously, there will be no intentional bequests. We establish global convergence to the
unique long-run equilibrium. Whether the capital stock with the scheme falls short of,
or exceeds, the laissez-faire capital stock in the long run depends on the intertemporal
elasticiy of substitution. Two welfare results are derived: First, a fully funded Social
Security scheme with time-invariant fixed contribution rate is welfare-increasing. Sec-
ond, the time-consistent pension policy, to which all subsequent generations will agree,
does even better. We show in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 that essential properties carry over
to the case of altruistic individuals.
3.1 Laissez-faire and a fixed contribution rate scheme
As a preliminary to the welfare analysis, I establish existence of a unique stationary
equilibrium if the contribution rate is treated as given when individuals make their
consumption-savings decisions, i.e. τt = τ . We assume throughout that the fixed
contribution rate is small enough to ensure that even the poorest individuals make
positive private saving. Laissez-faire serves as the benchmark to evaluate the welfare
consequences of Social Security. We use the term ’Laissez-faire’ to describe the world
without the scheme, so legal and administrative basis of the latter is absent. The
laissez-faire economy corresponds to τ = 0.
When young, an egoistic individual j, born in period t, decides on private savings and
consumption in youth. When old, if she survives, she simply consumes the proceeds
from savings. The maximization problem of individual j in the presence of the fixed
contribution rate scheme,
max
ajt
u(w(1− τ) + bjt − a
j
t) + β(1− q)u
(
ajtR +
τwR
1− q
)
, (4)
yields the Euler equation
u′(cjt) = β(1− q)Ru
′(cjt+1). (5)
Note the presence of mortality in (5), whose form is such that the scheme with a fixed
contribution rate does not affect intertemporal trade-offs. Let u be iso-elastic, with
parameter σ, u(c) = u0 +
c1−σ−1
1−σ
, u0 > 0. Then, the associated savings function is
ajt = a¯e(w(1− τ) + b
j
t)− (1− a¯e)τw/(1− q), where a¯e =
[
1 + (β(1− q)R1−σ)−1/σ
]
−1
is
the egoistic individual’s propensity to save out of the present value of lifetime income.
Note that τ ≤ τ 0 = a¯e(1−q)
1−qa¯e
ensures non-negative private savings of those individuals
7Similar models are derived in Abel (1985) and Eckstein et al. (1985). I use the model for evaluating
long-run welfare consequences of the scheme.
7
who do not receive any bequest. Plugging the optimal decision back into the direct
utility function, gives indirect utility of the egoistic individual j, V jt,e(τ)
8.
Since accidental bequests stem from the parent’s savings,
ajt = b¯
j
ta
j
t−1 + w¯(τ), (6)
where
w¯(τ) = a¯e × w(1− τ)− (1− a¯e)τw/(1− q),
b¯jt = 0χ(I
j
t−1 = 0) +Ra¯eχ(I
j
t−1 = 1),
Eb¯t = Ra¯eq,
and χ is an indicator function so that χ(z) = 1 if z is true, and χ = 0 if z is false.
Ijt−1 = 0 indicates that the individual’s parent survived into old age, and makes no
intergenerational transfer. Ijt−1 = 1 indicates that the individual’s parent died early
and left an accidental bequest to the heir.
Lemma 1 establishes convergence to the unique stationary equilibrium. Part (ii) of
the Lemma states that the fully funded pension scheme with fixed contribution rate
crowds out the long-run aggregate capital stock by reducing the accidental bequests.
With an eye on Propositions 1 and 2, note that in the current setup, aggregates coincide
with ex ante expectations.
Lemma 1. Convergence to the unique stationary equilibrium distribution
Let Ra¯eq < 1 and τ ≤ τ
0. Then
(i) ajt converges to a
j
∞
as t→∞, where the distribution of aj
∞
is the unique solution
to9
aj
∞
=d b¯jt × a
j
∞
+ w¯(τ),
which is independent of aj0.
(ii) the long-run aggregate capital stock
Eajt = Ke(τ) = w¯(τ)/(1−Ra¯eq) (7)
is strictly decreasing in the contribution rate τ .
Proof. (i) By iterating (6), one obtains
aj
∞
=d w¯(τ) + w¯(τ)
∞∑
i=1
b¯j1b¯
j
2 · · · b¯
j
i−1. (8)
By Jensen’s inequality, Eb¯t = Ra¯eq < 1 implies E log(b¯
j
t)(≤ logEb¯
j
t) < 0, which is a
sufficient condition for convergence of the infinite sum (see Vervaat, 1979). (ii) w¯ is
strictly decreasing in τ .
8We use V jt,e(τ) as a shortcut for V
j
t,e
(
c
j
t (τ), c
j
t+1(τ)
)
, where cjt (τ) and c
j
t+1(τ) denote the optimal
decision in the presence of the system with a fixed contribution rate.
9=d means equality in distribution.
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In an economy populated by overlapping generations the reduction in the aggregate
capital stock is a misleading indicator for the welfare consequences of the scheme. We
next show that, once ex ante insurance is taken into account, the crowding out of
capital is consistent with welfare improvements. First note that Lemma 1 implies con-
vergences in distribution of all other relevant variables. In particular, lifetime income
and therefore consumption in youth, cjt(τ) = (1− a¯e)
(
w + bjt +
τw
1−q
)
converges in dis-
tribution.Since the fraction q of total population dies early and bequests are transferred
with interest, i.e. Ebjt = qRKe(τ), aggregate first-period consumption in the stationary
equilibrium is given by
Ecjt(τ) = Ce(τ) = (1− a¯e)
(
w
1−Ra¯eq
+
τwq(1−R)
(1− q)(1−Ra¯eq)
)
, (9)
where the term in brackets is the ex ante expected value of the present value of lifetime
income. The latter is unaffected by the scheme whenever capital is unproductive, and
so is Ecjt(τ).
In the egoistic economy, different mortality histories across lineages result in different
levels of lifetime income. As a consequence, individuals can be unambiguously identified
by their lineages’ mortality histories. Without ambiguity, therefore, I drop the index
j and reinterpret, as Abel (1985) does, the time index t as the number of previous
consecutive generations within a particular lineage whose members died prematurely.
By the consumption Euler equation (5), cjt+1(τ) is proportional to c
j
t(τ). It is therefore
enough to focus on first-period consumption. In order to prepare for Proposition 1, the
following lemma restates a result provided by Abel (1985) in a slidely different form
and also recognize that we work with a geometric distribution.
Lemma 2. (Abel, 1985) Geometric long-run distribution
In the long-run, individuals are geometrically distributed with probability mass func-
tion qt(1− q). First-period consumption of a type-t individual is
ct(τ) = w(1− τ)− w¯(τ) (a¯eR)
t + w¯(τ)(R− 1)
t∑
i=0
(a¯eR)
i . (10)
If Ra¯eq < 1, then limt→∞ ct(τ) = ∞ is compatible with the stationary equilibrium
defined in Lemma 1. In that case, there must be both winners and losers in the long
run (most likely, earlier). Figure B.1 suggests that this true even when the long-run
distributions have bounded supports. Suppose, for example, that capital is unproduc-
tive (this case is illustrated in Figure B.1(a)). Solving ct(τ) ≥ ct(0) for t shows that
welfare of all but those whose parents died prematurely and so left no bequests (the
poorest without the scheme) is reduced relative to the laissez-faire, τ = 0; for they
experience a negative income effect due to a reduction in bequests that dominates the
positive income effect stemming from the scheme. Figure B.1(b) illustrates this result
when R >> 1. Since type-t individuals occur with frequency qt(1 − q), individuals
whose parents died prematurely make up the fraction (1 − q) of the total young pop-
ulation. Anticipating the discussion in Section 5, let the economically active years
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start at the age of 20 and let life expectancy at birth be 80 years (i.e. q = 1/2). In
that case, the scheme makes one half of the young population better off. However, ex
post inequality translates into ex ante uncertainty, and the scheme produces a more
consentrated distribution of lifetime income in the stationary equilibrium. Risk-averse
individuals value the reduction in ex ante risk.
The next proposition avoids distributional aspects by evaluating welfare on the basis
of Rawls’s (1973) veil of ignorance. It exploits the fact that, under (22), individuals
consume a constant fraction of lifetime income for all σ > 0 and all 0 < β ≤ 1, thereby
generalizing Caliendo et al.’s (2014) Proposition 5. Suppose all individuals are present
behind the veil and are asked whether they prefer to be born into the laissez-faire
economy or the economy that runs the fully funded pension scheme. Due to the direct
link between an individual’s family mortality history and wealth at birth in the egoistic
economy, ignorance refers to the ex ante risk of being born into a particular lineage.
Proposition 1. Ex ante welfare-improving Social Security pensions with a
fixed contribution rate
Suppose that capital is unproductive, with q > 0, and τ ≤ τ 0 = a¯e(1−q)
1−qa¯e
. Then, fully
funded Social Security Pensions increase ex ante welfare.
Proof. If R = 1, then (9) and (10) imply ct(τ) = w(1 − a¯
t+1
e ) + wτ
(
1−a¯eq
1−q
a¯te − 1
)
,
with Ect(τ) = Ce(τ) =
(1−a¯e)w
1−Ra¯eq
. Therefore, Ce(τ) > c0(τ) > c0(0), and Ce(τ) <
ct(τ) < ct(0), t > 0, implying that the scheme induces a mean-preserving reduction
in the spread of consumption. The latter, in turn, implies second-order stochastic
dominance, i.e.
∫
t
Vt(τ) >
∫
t
Vt(0), which confirms the claim.
Proposition 1 is important, because it illustrates that the welfare impact of fully
funded Social Security pensions is systematically underestimated in the literature. In
fact, there are several contributions in the literature on accidental bequests in egoistic
economies that find no welfare impact stemming from the scheme if capital is unpro-
ductive (see e.g. Hubbard and Judd, 1987, and more recently Caliendo et al., 2014,
among others). The underlying assumption in the literature is that accidental bequests
are pooled and then transferred anonymously. In the long-run, the income effect from
reduced accidental bequests and the income effect stemming from reduced net wage
income and additional pension benefit exactly cancel out. Therefore, long-run welfare
is unaffected by the scheme when capital is unproductive.
3.2 Time-consistent pension policy
This section establishes that the welfare gains from Social Security Pensions are further
underestimated relative to those found in 3.1; for individuals treated the contribution
rate as given when making their decisions. On the other extreme, contemporary gen-
erations are able to decide for themselves on the individual contributions made to the
pension system. In fact, in the two-period setup presented here, each generation is able
10
to revise previous pension policy without producing intergenerational conflicts. This
implies that the pension system essentially acts like privately organised, actuarially fair
annuities markets, with a coompetitive premium taken by the firms which fully and
exclusively reflects the prevailing mortality regime.10
The maximization problem of individual j is
max
cjt ,c
j
t+1,τ
j
t
u(cjt) + β(1− q)u(c
j
t+1) (11)
subject to
cjt = w(1− τ
j
t ) + b
j
t − a
j
t (12)
cjt+1 = a
j
tR + τ
j
t wR/(1− q) (13)
τ jt ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
The first-order condition with respect to τ jt is
u′(cjt) = βRu
′(cjt+1), (15)
where mortality has dropped out. Since individuals do not value their wealth after
death, the scheme promises a higher expected rate of return than the market does, and
egoistic individuals do not save privately. Of course, optimality of full annuitization
is a well-known result if individuals save out of pure selfishness (see Yaari, 1965). In
the egoistic economy, full annuitization eliminates all bequests. Moreover, under the
assumption that all are alike at t = 0, and receive zero bequests, there is intragen-
erational agreement on the optimal policy for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. From (15) we
have
Lemma 3. Unique time-consistent pension policy
There exists a unique time-consistent optimal contribution rate:
τ ∗e =
[
1 + (βR1−σ)−1/σ/(1− q)
]−1
, ∀j, t. (16)
The pension policy (16) is termed time-consistent: All generations are able, but not
willing, to revise previous policies. The time consistent policy is therefore sustainable
in the long-run. The associated indirect utility is denoted by Vt(τ
∗
e ).
For the remainder of this section, let β−1 = R = 1. In that case, Abel (1985) shows
that the long-run capital stock of the laissez-faire economy (τ = 0) falls short of the
one associated with the time-consistent policy in (16), i.e. τ ∗ew if and only if σ < σ˜ ≡[
1− ln(1+q(1−q))
ln(1−q)
]
−1
< 1. The reason is that each generation can revise previous policy,
so the increase in effective rate of return affects intertemporal trade-offs (compare
(15) and (5)). The associated income effect induces the young individual to increase
10One can think of a large number of insurance companies which receive the market interest rate
on their reserves and earn zero profits under perfect competition.
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current consumption and to reduce savings. In contrast, the associated substitution
effect induces the individual to save more to old age. An intertemporal elasticity of
substitution larger than one (σ < 1) and perfectly selfish individuals imply that the
substitution effect dominates the income effect, so the propensity to save is higher
with the scheme. Whether this effect compensates for the elimination of accidental
bequests depends on whether σ is small enough. The following corollary states that if
the fixed contribution rate of Section 3.1 is small enough, then the associated capital
stock exceeds the one associated with the time-consistent policy defined in (16).
Corollary 1. Let β−1 = R = 1, and σ > σ˜. Then,
Ke(τ) > Ke(τ
∗
e ) as τ < τ˜ ,
where τ˜ = τ 0 − 1−q
1+ 1
1−q
> 0.
As already shown in Section 3.1, the evolution of aggregates is an imperfect indicator
of welfare. The next proposition states that the time-consistent policy is ex ante
welfare-improving and dominates the system with fixed contribution rate for all σ > 0
and all τ < τ 0.
Proposition 2. Dominance of time-consistent Policy
If R = 1, then the time-consistent pension policy defined in Lemma 3 dominates, in
welfare terms, the fully funded scheme with fixed contribution rate τ < τ 0.
Proof. The proof is accomplished by constructing an auxiliary consumption allocation
induced by a policy that redistributes the assets of those who die prematurely to the
next generation in a lump-sum manner. With this policy, all members of a generation
receive identical accidental bequests, and the Euler equation is of the form of (5).
The associated first-period consumption is cLSt = (1 − a¯e)
(
w + bLS
)
, where bLS =
qR
1+(β(1−q)R1−σ)−1/σ−qR
w. First, R = 1 implies EcLSt = Ect(τ) and therefore V
LS >
V (τ); for the lump-sum policy induces a mean-preserving elimination of any spread
in consumption. Second, if R = 1, then (cLSt , c
LS
t+1) and (ct(τ
∗
e ), ct+1(τ
∗
e )) are on the
same budget line. Therefore, while feasible, the auxiliary allocation is not chosen. By
revealed preference, V (τ ∗e ) > V
LS > V (τ).
The conclusion from Propositions 1 and 2 is that the crowding out of bequests
and capital induced by fully funded schemes is consistent with long-run welfare gains
whenever capital is not too productive, a claim that follows at once from the strict
inequalities above and the continuity of V . Moreover, if each generation is able to re-
vise previous policy, then the scheme even increases long-run capital stock for plausible
values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The associated substitution effect
is positive in welfare terms. From a generational perspective, the revised contribution
rate setup seems plausible; for the scheme should be regarded as acting like annuities
markets, although contributions are wage-related. As a final remark, note that neither
of the policy regimes is Pareto-improving relative to the laissez-faire. This is obvious
from the discussion following Lemma 2 for the case of a fixed contribution rate. More-
over, the time-consistent pension policy yields ct(τ
∗
e ) = w/(2− q) < w = limt→∞ ct(0).
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4 The altruistic economy
This section studies the dynamics and long-run behaviour of the altruistic economy with
and without Social Security. It uses the apparatus of Section 3 to establish convergence
to the unique stationary equilibrium in the presence of uninsured mortality risk and an
operative bequest motive. The clear-cut welfare results derived for the egoistic economy
studied in the previous section are feasible because there are direct relationships, first,
between an individual’s family mortality history and her expected liftime income, and
second, between expected lifetime income and welfare. Both links break in the altruistic
economy. The welfare consequences of the scheme are therefore studied numerically in
Section 5.
4.1 Dynamics under laissez-faire
When young, individual j, born in period t, decides on private savings and consumption
in youth. When old, if she survives, she allocates the proceeds from savings between
old-age consumption and inter-vivos transfers. These choices are determined by the
individuals’ attitudes towards time, risk and their heirs.
The individual’s maximization problem is
max
ajt
U jt
subject to
cjt = w + b
j
t − a
j
t , (17)[
cj,0t+1, b
j,0
t+1
]
≡ argmax
[
u(cjt+1) + ν(b
j
t+1)
]
s.t. cjt+1 + b
j
t+1 = a
j
tR (18)
bj,1t+1 = a
j
tR (19)
ajt ≥ 0, b
j,0
t+1 ≥ 0, c
j,0
t+1 ≥ 0. (20)
given the bequest bjt .
11 Intergenerational transfers, pleasurable or not, are non-negative;
for by assumption, individuals cannot be forced to accept negative bequests (liabilities
left by their parents). For simplicity, both kinds are distributed at the very beginning
of each period. Since all individuals born in t = 0 have parents who survived to old-age,
all receive the same bequests at that point in time so that there is no intragenerational
heterogeneity at this point. Without loss of generality, let bj0 = 0 ∀j. Unlike in the case
of egoistic individuals, problem (2) - (20) needs to be solved by backwards induction.
Assuming an interior solution to (18), u′(c) = ν ′(b).
The first-order conditions with respect to ajt may be written as
12
u′(cjt) ≥ β(1− q)Rν
′(bj,0t+1) + βqν
′(Rajt)R. (21)
11By the assumption that bequests received are known prior to the decision, the individual is only
concerned with the uncertainty associated with her own life.
12It is readily verified that the second derivative with respect to ajt is negative, so the solution is
indeed a maximum.
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Individuals save out of a pure life-cycle motive (i.e. for old-age consumption), and out
of an altruistic motive (i.e. for making direct intergenerational transfers). Recalling
(18), both motives are summarized in the first term on the right-hand side of (21).
The last term arises due to the prevalence of uninsured mortality risk, which tends to
increase private savings.
Let u and ν be iso-elastic, with common parameter σ:13
u(c) = u0 +
c1−σ − 1
1− σ
, (22)
ν(b) = γ
b1−σ − 1
1− σ
. (23)
The parameter u0 > 0 determines the felicity gap between life and death, a condition
which is implicit in the above requirement of non-pathological behaviour with respect
to the bequest motive (see Section 2.3). Also note that u0 > 0 does not affect the
inter-temporal consumption allocation. To use terminology carefully, σ > 0 is, by
definition, the elasticity of marginal felicity from consumption and intergenerational
transfers, respectively. It is readily verified that limσ→1 u(c) = ln(c). The parameter
0 < γ ≤ 1 measures the strength of the bequest motive. Note that (23) implies that
inter vivos transfers are normal goods.
Since (22) and (23) satisfy the lower Inada condition (that is, limx→0 u
′(x) =∞, and
limx→0 ν
′(x) =∞), inter vivos transfers are always positive if the parents survive into
old age. The consumption-transfer allocation is
bj,0t+1 =
γ1/σ
1 + γ1/σ
Ra¯(w + bjt) (24)
c0t+1 =
1
1 + γ1/σ
Ra¯(w + bt) (25)
Moreover, individuals optimally save a constant fraction of the expected present value
of their lifetime incomes, i.e. ajt = a¯(w + b
j
t), where
a¯ =
{
1 +
[
βR1−σ
(
(1− q)
(
1 + γ1/σ
)σ
+ qγ
)]
−1/σ
}
−1
< 1 (26)
denotes the propensity to save out of lifetime income under laissez-faire, a propensity
which is increasing in the strength of the bequest motive. Note that lifetime income
equals initial wealth only if previous pension policy can be revised. Note that the
desire to make transfers to the heir increases the said propensity relative to the case of
egoistic individuals, i.e. a¯ > a¯e.
In the absence of the scheme, the randomness of premature death causes individuals
to differ in the bequests they receive at the start of the first period of their lives: bjt arises
13For simplicity, we assume that both kinds of transfers receive the same weight γ, albeit one can
imagine that inter vivos may be higher valued by the individual. Abel (1986) and Lockwood (2012)
employ these funtional forms with u0 = 0. Lockwood (2012) extends (23) to cover inter-vivos transfer
as luxury goods.
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from the mortality history ςjt . Since premature death is identically and independently
distributed, intragenerational heterogeneity with respect to bjt arises and is increasing
as time passes. Recalling (19) and (24), savings evolve according to the stochastic first-
order difference equation with an identically and independently distributed coefficient
ajt = b¯
j
ta
j
t−1 + w¯, (27)
with w¯ = a¯ × w and the random variable b¯jt =
γ1/σ
1+γ1/σ
Ra¯χ(Ijt−1 = 0) + Ra¯χ(I
j
t−1 = 1).
Ijt−1 = 0 indicates that the individual’s parent survived into old age, and, in contrast
to the previous section, makes an inter-vivos transfer. Ijt−1 = 1 indicates that the
individual’s parent died early and left an accidental bequest to the heir. Note that
Eb¯t = q ×
γ1/σ
1+γ1/σ
Ra¯+ (1− q)×Ra¯ = Ra¯ q+γ
1/σ
1+γ1/σ
.
The stationary equilibrium is given by prices (R,w), an allocation (cjt , c
j
t+1, b
j
t+1, a
j
t),
and a time-invariant distribution lifetime income such that, given (R,w), the allocation
maximizes expected utility defined in (2), and individual choices are consistent with
the economy-wide resource constraint. Lemma 4 generalizes Lemma 1 by establishing
convergence of the altruistic economy to the unique stationary equilibrium.
Lemma 4. Convergence in distribution
(i) Let Ra¯ q+γ
1/σ
1+γ1/σ
< 1. Then, ajt converges to a
j
∞
as t→∞, where the distribution of
aj
∞
is the unique solution to
aj
∞
=d b¯jt × a
j
∞
+ w¯,
which is independent of aj0.
(ii) If Ra¯ < 1, then the long-run capital distribution has bounded support, aj ∈
[w¯/(1− γ1/σa¯R/(1 + γ1/σ)), w¯/(1− a¯R)].
Proof. By iterating (27), one obtains
aj
∞
=d w + w
∞∑
i=1
b¯j1b¯
j
2 · · · b¯
j
i−1 (28)
(i) Eb¯t = Ra¯
q+γ1/σ
1+γ1/σ
< 1 implies (by Jensen’s inequality) E log(b¯jt)(≤ logEb¯
j
t) < 0, which
is a sufficient condition for convergence of the infinite sum, (see Vervaat, 1979). (ii)
The bounds follow by setting b¯t = Ra¯, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ and b¯t =
γ1/σ
1+γ1/σ
Ra¯, γ
1/σ
1+γ1/σ
<
1, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞, respectively.
The long-run distribution deserves some comment. First, if capital is unproductive
(i.e. R = 1), then the support is bounded without further assumptions. From (26),
however, the bounds are growing with R whenever σ < 1. If R > 1, then convergence
and boundedness require the interest rate to be sufficiently small, albeit R >> 1.
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Intuitively, since bequests are transferred with interest, too large an interest rate makes
bequests grow without bounds as time passes, which is at odds with the requirement
of a stationary equilibrium. Second, the underlying stochastic difference equation (27)
follows one particular lineage, lineage j, and the associated equilibrium distribution
summarizes the possible states into which the members of lineage j can be born. Recall,
however, that mortality is identically and independently distributed across both time
and individuals, and that all individuals born in t = 0 are alike. Therefore, (28) must
hold for all lineages, and the system exhibits asymptotic stationarity: with a continuum
of individuals at any point in time and a long enough time horizon, the distibution
of lifetime income of members of lineage j across time coincides with the distribution
across all lineages at a given point in time.
Proposition 3 states the long-run levels of aggregate lifetime income, capital stock
and consumption, respectively.
Proposition 3. Long-run Aggregates under Laissez-faire Let Ra¯ q+γ
1/σ
1+γ1/σ
< 1.
Then, aggregate lifetime income, capital stock and consumption in the laissez-faire
economy converge to the long-run equilibrium values
ω(0) = lim
t→∞
∫ 1
0
(w + bjt)dj =
w
1−Ra¯ q+γ
1/σ
1+γ1/σ
<∞, (29)
K(0) = lim
t→∞
R×
∫ 1
0
a¯(w + bjt)dj = a¯Rω, (30)
C(0) = lim
t→∞
∫ 1
0
cjtdj + lim
t→∞
(1− q)
∫ 1
0
cjt+1dj =
(
(1− a¯) +
Ra¯(1− q)
1 + γ1/σ
)
ω. (31)
Proof. Follows directly from the discussion in Vervaat (1979). (31) uses the fact that
only the fraction (1−q) of young workers survives to old age. The consumption-transfer
allocation is derived in Appendix A.
Figure B.2 displays the long-run distribution of the expected value of lifetime income
for alternative values of R. Note that a¯ > a¯e implies that the aggregates exceed their
counterparts in the egoistic economy.14
4.2 Dynamics with the optimal scheme
Following Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), we rely on the assumption that each generation
can freely decide on the contribution rate. Recalling (3), the individual’s maximization
problem is
max
ajt ,τ
j
t
U jt
14We can not obtain a similar result for the second moments. Applying the result in Section
5.2.2 of Vervaat (1979), for example the long-run capital distribution has variance w¯
2
(1−Eb¯2
t
)(1−Eb¯t)2
×(
Eb¯2t − (Eb¯t)
2
)
, which can exceed or falls short of its egoistic counterpart.
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subject to
cjt = w(1− τ
j
t ) + b
j
t − a
j
t , (32)[
cj,0t+1, b
j,0
t+1
]
≡ argmax u(cjt+1) + ν(b
j
t+1) s.t. c
j
t+1 + b
j
t+1 = a
j
tR +
τ jt wR
1− q
(33)
bj,1t+1 = a
j
tR (34)
ajt ≥ 0, b
j,0
t+1 ≥ 0, c
j,0
t+1, τ
j
t ∈ [0, 1]. (35)
given bjt .
The first-order conditions with respect to ajt and τ
j
t may be written as
u′(cjt) ≥ β(1− q)Rν
′(bj,0t+1) + βqν
′(Rajt)R (= if a
j
t > 0), (36)
u′(cjt) = βRν
′(bj,0t+1). (37)
respectively. Combining (36) and (37) gives
ν ′(bj,0t+1) = ν
′(Rajt), (38)
so that no accidental bequests occur (i.e. the difference between inter-vivos transfers
and the bequests in case of peremature death is zero). A similar result is derived in
Abel (1986) and Lockwood (2012). Fuster (2000) derives this condition for the bequest
motive suggested by Barro (1974).15 By virtue of the assumptions on u and ν, (37) im-
plies τ ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the optimal contribution rate that brings about the desired
equality of bequests across states in (38) is unique; for the LHS of (38) is monotoni-
cally decreasing in τ , while the RHS is independent of the contribution rate. Finally,
by virtue of the old-age budget constraint, individuals use pension benefits exclusively
to finance old age consumption, while the proceeds from conventional savings are used
to finance intergenerational transfers.
Combining (36) and (38) yields
u′(cjt) = βRν
′(Rajt), (39)
which determines the optimal fraction of overall savings to be privately saved. Since
individuals are able to revise previous policies, the scheme affects intergenerational
trade-offs. In particular, mortality (the only source of uncertainty in the model) van-
ishes in (39). The induced temporary allocation is, therefore, the result of the standard
income and substitution effects stemming from an increased effective rate of return of
the individual portfolio and an insurance effect, since the scheme allows equalization
of bequest streams. Recalling the first-period budget constraint, the LHS of (39) is
increasing in ajt . Since the RHS is decreasing in a
j
t , the lower Inada condition ensures
uniqueness of the optimal decision (ajt , τ
j,t).
Since all individuals at the beginning of time receive zero bequests, there will be
intragenerational agreement on the contribution rate for all t ≥ 0, so members of the
15In the pure altruistic case, one applies the envelope theorem to find the impact of the bequest on
the maximum utility attainable by her heir born in t+ 1.
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same generation receive the same amount of bequests in the presence of the scheme.
In the presence of the scheme, therefore, there is no need to keep the index j.
Using the parametrization (22) and (23), the consumption-transfer ratio is inde-
pendent of lifetime income, and the income expansion paths under full insurance for
youth consumption, old-age consumption and both kind of intergenerational trans-
fers are straight lines through the origin. From (38), τtw = at(1 − q)/γ
1/σ. Us-
ing this information in the first-period budget constraint and equation (39) gives
optimal private savings as a function of initial wealth, at = a¯(τ
∗)(w + bt), where
s¯(τ ∗) = a¯(τ ∗)(1 + (1− q)/γ1/σ); or, in closed form,
a¯(τ ∗) =
γ1/σ
1− q + γ1/σ + (βR1−σ)−1/σ
(40)
is the time-invariant fraction of lifetime income that is privately saved. The linearity
of the model implies that the portfolio decision is independent of the overall savings
decision. The sum of annuitized and non-annuitized savings is given by st = s¯(w+ b
j
t),
where
s¯(τ ∗) =
{
1 +
[
βR1−σ(1− q + γ1/σ)σ
]−1/σ}−1
(41)
is the propensity to save out of lifetime income. Note that the fraction 1
1+γ1/σ/(1−q)
of
the individual’s portfolio is held as pension claims. We have therefore established
Lemma 5. Sequence of optimal contribution rates
The sequence
τ ∗t =
a¯τ∗(1− q)
γ1/σ
w + bt
w
= a¯(τ ∗)(1− q)/γ1/σ ×
t∑
i=0
(Ra¯(τ ∗))i . (42)
converges from below to
lim
t→∞
τ ∗t = τ
∗ =
[
1 +
(βR1−σ)−1/σ + γ1/σ(1−R)
1− q
]−1
. (43)
Proof. (42) is obvious from the above discussion. IfRa¯(τ ∗) < 1, then τ ∗t →
a¯(τ∗)(1−q)
γ1/σ(1−Ra¯(τ∗))
as t → ∞. Since the optimal split of the portfolio is independent of lifetime income,
i.e. τ
∗w
ωt
= a¯(τ ∗)(1− q)/γ1/σ), τt+1 > τt ∀t <∞. Finally, using (40) confirms (43).
Note that Lemma 5 accounts for the transfer reduction induced by the scheme. The
fact that we can define a sequence of non-zero optimal contribution rates should be
contrasted with the seminal work of Barro (1974), who finds that government policy
intended to change the intergenerational distribution of resources is neutral in wel-
fare terms, so that the optimal contribution rate remains indeterminate. The present
non-neutrality result is not driven by the conceptional difference in bequest motives
discussed above. Rather, it is the existence of uninsured mortality risk that breaks the
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equivalence of Social Security pensions and private savings, a risk that does not appear
in Barro (1974).
The essential result of the next corollary is that the sequence of optimal contribution
rates in an unproductive economy populated by altruistic individuals converges to the
time-consistent contribution rate of its egoistic counterpart.
Corollary 2. τ ∗ R τ ∗e =
1
1+β−1/σ/(1−q)
as R R 1.
The corollary states that τ ∗ is independent of the strength of the transfer motive when
capital is unproductive. The economic intuition is as follows. Since the proceeds from
annuitized savings are used for old-age consumption, the fraction of lifetime income
saved in annuities is decreasing in the strength of the transfer motive. This tends to
decrease the optimal contribution rate, given lifetime income. In turn, non-annuitized
fraction of lifetime income in t increases with γ, and is transferred with interest to
the next generation in t + 1, independently of whether the individual survives to old
age. Since contributions are wage-related, this effect tends to increase the optimal
contribution rate. If capital is unproductive (R = 1), then both effects exactly cancel
out in the long-run, so τ ∗ is independent of the strength of the bequest motive. In fact,
a comparison of (16) and (43) establishes the results that long-run optimal contribution
rate coincides with the one obtained in an economy populated with perfectly selfish
individuals. Finally, since non-annuitized savings are transferred with interest, the
latter (former) effect dominates the former (latter) as R > 1 (R < 1).
Since the scheme is fully funded, contributions to the scheme add to the economy-
wide capital stock in the next period. Let K(τ ∗) denote the long-run aggregate capital
stock in the presence of the scheme. We have the following results:
Proposition 4. Convergence with the scheme
If Ra¯(τ ∗) < 1, then the economy with the scheme converges to the deterministic
steady state with
ω(τ ∗) = lim
t→∞
(w + bt) =
w
1−Ra¯(τ ∗)
, (44)
K(τ ∗) = lim
t→∞
Kt = s¯(τ
∗)Rω(τ ∗), (45)
C(τ ∗) = (1− a¯(τ ∗))ω(τ ∗), (46)
(47)
Proof. By iteration, the sequenceKt+1 = R(at+τtw) = [(1−q)/γ
1/σ+1]a¯(τ)R
(
w + bjt
)
=
s¯w
∑t
i=0 (Ra¯)
i + s¯ (a¯R)t converges if Ra¯(τ ∗) < 1.
In the special case of unproductive capital, aggregate consumption is unaffected by
the scheme and is equal to wage income w. If, moreover, β−1 = R = γ = 1, then the
income expansion paths with respect to consumption and transfers are straight lines
through the origin with slopes equal to one, implying a perfectly smooth consumption-
transfer profile, ct(τ
∗) = ct+1(τ
∗) = bt+1(τ
∗) = at(τ
∗) = w/(2− q). Since u = ν in that
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case, the allocation sequence can be obtain ed without specifying the felicity function.
In stationary equilirium, K(τ ∗) = C(τ ∗) = w = C(0) < K(0), where τ ∗ = 1−q
2−q
∀σ.
While the scheme contributes to capital accumulation, it unambiguously reduces the
long-run capital stock. In general, however, the effect of the scheme on the long-run
capital stock is ambigous a priori. To see why, the following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 6. (Propensities to save)
1. If σ = 1, then the propensity to save is unaffected by the scheme, s¯(τ ∗) = a¯.
2. If σ < 1, then the propensity to save in the economy with the scheme is higher
than in the economy without it, s¯(τ ∗) > a¯.
Proof. The first part follows directly from equations (26) and (41). Suppose σ < 1.
Comparing (26) and (41) gives s¯(τ) > a¯ if and only if
(1− q + γ1/σ)σ > (1− q)(1 + γ1/σ)σ + qγ.
Rewriting the LHS, we have (1−q+γ1/σ)σ = ((1−q)(1+γ1/σ)+qγ1/σ)σ > ((1−q)(1+
γ1/σ))σ, ∀σ > 0. As to the RHS, (1− q)(1 + γ1/σ)σ + qγ ≤
(
(1− q)(1 + γ1/σ)
)σ
+ qγ <(
(1− q)(1 + γ1/σ)
)σ
; for σ ≤ 1 by assumption.
Intuitively, there are two components of the effective return to saving, namely, the
expected return of the portfolio and the transfer insurance. Since the scheme is actu-
arially fair, the expected rate of return of the portfolio (including the premature death
case) is simply R and therefore unaffected by the scheme, so the change in the propen-
sity to save must be due to the bequest insurance effect. With bequest insurance, the
marginal value of transferring one unit of consumption to the next period increases.
In that sense, the bequest insurance appears to be an additional return to saving, and
Lemma 6 states that if σ < 1 the effect of the transfer insurance on savings acts like
a substitution effect stemming from an increase in the portfolio’s return. The scheme
increases the propensity to save out of lifetime income, which, in turn, tends to increase
the long-run capital stock.
Moreover, while both annutized and non-annuitized savings add to the capital stock,
the scheme reduces the fraction of initial wealth that is privately saved, i.e. a¯(τ ∗) <
a¯, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Only non-annuitized assets are transferred, and the resulting reduc-
tion in transfers received at birth tends to reduce the long run capital stock. Which of
these opposing effects dominates is eventually a numerical question.16
16One might proceed instead by imposing σ → 1, in which case the fraction of initial wealth saved
for old age (in the form of both annuitized and non-annuitized assets) in the presence of the scheme
equals the propensity to save under laissez faire (s¯(τ∗) = a¯(0)). If, moreover, R = 1, then the scheme
unambiguously decreases the long-run capital stock, i.e. K(τ) < K(0) for all 0 < γ ≤ 1.
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5 Simulations: The cost of (in-)equality
The infinite series w
(
1 + b¯1 + b¯1b¯2 + b¯1b¯2b¯3 + . . .
)
converges quickly, particularly when
the b¯t’s are small. It is thus fairly easy to generate approximate samples from the
distribution of ω∞ by taking a fairly short truncation. To be more precise, we follow
one particular realization of the stochastic time series until |ωjt − ω
j
t+1| < 10
−6. With
R = 1, for example, there is convergence within ten periods. A large sample of these
stochastic elements is generated.
The parameters of the model economy are determined as follows. In order to maintain
the two-period theoretical structure, let the economically active years start at the age of
20, and let one period span 40 years, implying that individuals reach retirement at the
age of 60, the upper bound of life being 100 years. It seems tempting to impose q = 1/2
as a benchmark as it implies a life expectancy at birth of 80 years. However, q = 1/2
also implies that only one half, no less, of all 20 years-old fail to reach retirement. Since
mortality rates begin to rise rapidly only after the age of 65 or 70, significantly lower
values for q seem more suitable. We opt for the latter perspective and treat q = 0.3 as
a benchmark.
Let σ = 2, which corresponds to the standard value of 1/2 for the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution frequently found in the literature. By way of sensitivity
analysis, Appendix C provides results for σ = .5. The remaining taste parameters
are set so as to match the following targets: First, most of the literature on real
business cycles employ a quarterly psychological discount factor of 0.9914 (see, e.g.,
Cooley and Prescott, 1995). Since premature mortality is an important determinant
of subjective discounting in the present setup, let β = 0.35 which, in conjunction with
q = 0.3, is equivalent to an effective subjective discount rate of 1/(β(1 − q)) − 1 per
period, or 3.58% p.a.17 Second, the strength of the transfer motive is set so as to
match old age income from public transfers in per cent of their disposable income,
(τ ∗w/(1− q))/(a(τ ∗)+ τ ∗w/(1− q)) = 1/(1+ γ1/σ). Note that this number is indepen-
dent of time preferences, mortality and the market rate of return. The rough average
for OECD countries of about 2/3 serves as the reference, implying γ = 0.25.
5.1 The long-run allocation
Table 1 reports the average allocations with and without the fully funded Social Se-
curity for alternative values of the probability premature death and the real rate of
return on physical capital. One can think of the upper and lower panel, respectively,
as separate islands, each with its particular q and R. Consider the constellation
(1 − q, R) = (0.7, 1) in the lower panel, which serves as the benchmark scenario.18
17β is usually chosen so as to match the market rate of return. In the current setup, however, the
latter is exogenously given.
18Some data indicate an average annual real rate of return (reported as the lending interest rate
adjusted for inflation) for most high income countries roughly between 2.5% and 7.5% p.a. in recent
decades; see for example, the World Development Indicator data base, which covers the period 1961-
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The remaining parameters yield Social Security expenditures of 29.3% of aggregate
wage income, or 19.5% of gross domestic output, which are fairly close to the numbers
in developed countries when one includes other pillars of Social Security such as health
care and the like in the picture. The national savings rate in the long run equilib-
rium with the scheme is about 33%. In keeping with the theoretical results, aggregate
consumption is unaffected by the scheme, but the national capital stock and wealth
are reduced substantially: bequest wealth is 29% lower than under laissez-faire.19 The
magnitudes of both the wealth reduction and the ex ante insurance effect increase with
R. For example, the coefficient of variation for lifetime income under laissez-faire in-
creases from 0.136 with R = 1 to 0.432 with R = 1.0340, in which case the equilibrium
distribution has unbounded support.
5.2 Long-run welfare consequences
Table 1 also contains the long-run welfare consequences of the scheme. Following
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Fehr and Habermann (2008), the latter are calculated
as the percentage increase in initial wealth (which coincides with the expected present
value of lifetime income in the current setup) that is necessary to make an individual
living in the laissez-faire equilibrium as well off as in the equilibrium with the scheme.
For individual j ∈ [0, 1] born in t, this percentage solves V ∗j (0, φ
j×ωjt ) = V
∗(τ ∗, ωt(τ
∗)),
where φj is derived in the Appendix. Again, Rawls’s (1973) veil of ignorance will
be used to quantify the gains from insurance against the risk of being born into a
particular initial wealth position. Therefore, I ‘sum’ over all individuals in the laissez-
faire equilibrium to derive the long-run welfare consequence before the individual’s type
is revealed,20
φ =
∫ 1
0
φjdj. (48)
In the linear model, the portfolio decision is independent of the decision on how much
to carry over to old age (i.e., the choice of sjt = a
j
t + τ
j
t w). Moreover, it can be seen in
equations (40) and (42) that the individual’s problem is scalable in wealth: Both the
optimal purchase of pension claims as a fraction of total savings,
[
1 + γ1/σ/(1− q)
]
−1
,
and the propensity to save are independent of wealth. Since intergenerational transfers
arise from previous savings, bequests received (and therefore the expected present value
of lifetime income) by any individual j at the beginning of her first period of life are
proportional to wage income, where the factor of proportionality is determined by
the mortality history of her lineage. Since factor prices are fixed by assumption and
unaffected by the scheme, this holds true with and without Social Security pensions,
and the population average equivalent variation defined in (48) is invariant to shifts
2013. Since we are mainly interested in the scheme’s very long-run welfare implications and the data
span no more than 1.5 generations, relatively modest real interest rates seem appropriate.
19Recall that only the fraction 1− q survives to old age, such that aggregate consumption in period
t amounts to c∗t + (1− q)c
∗
t .
20Recall that an individual’s family mortality history uniquely determines her wealth at birth if
individuals are perfectly selfish. In that case, (48) ’sums’ over all possible states.
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Table 1: Laissez-faire and the optimal scheme: long-run (average) allocation and welfare effects, γ = 0.25, σ = 2
R (1-q) c∗t c
∗
t+1 a
∗
t s
∗
t b
∗
t K/Y b/Y SSE φ− 1 φ1 − 1 φ2 − 1 φ3 − 1
τ = 0
1.0040 0.5 0.819 0.361 0.542 0.361 0.351 0.234
0.6 0.776 0.368 0.553 0.328 0.356 0.211
0.7 0.735 0.372 0.559 0.294 0.358 0.188
1.0140 0.5 0.996 0.536 0.540 0.536 0.299 0.297
0.6 0.937 0.543 0.547 0.485 0.302 0.267
0.7 0.882 0.545 0.549 0.431 0.302 0.237
1.0240 0.5 1.267 0.830 0.564 0.832 0.251 0.370
0.6 1.179 0.832 0.565 0.744 0.251 0.331
0.7 1.094 0.824 0.559 0.653 0.250 0.292
1.0340 0.5 1.761 1.402 0.645 1.405 0.208 0.453
0.6 1.599 1.371 0.631 1.229 0.206 0.402
0.7 1.445 1.322 0.608 1.053 0.204 0.353
τ = τ ∗
1.0040 0.5 0.772 0.457 0.228 0.457 0.228 0.313 0.157 15.7 0.26 9.00 1.94 -10.64
0.6 0.738 0.437 0.218 0.480 0.218 0.324 0.147 17.7 0.55 7.61 1.86 -8.92
0.7 0.707 0.418 0.209 0.502 0.209 0.334 0.139 19.5 0.64 5.93 1.64 -6.93
1.0140 0.5 0.890 0.642 0.216 0.431 0.321 0.263 0.196 13.1 -3.92 7.86 3.56 -15.34
0.6 0.853 0.616 0.207 0.455 0.308 0.271 0.184 14.8 -2.84 6.70 3.38 -12.91
0.7 0.819 0.591 0.199 0.477 0.296 0.279 0.173 16.3 -1.90 5.25 2.94 -10.09
1.0240 0.5 1.043 0.917 0.208 0.415 0.459 0.217 0.239 10.8 -9.20 6.84 6.69 -22.75
0.6 1.002 0.881 0.199 0.439 0.440 0.223 0.224 12.2 -7.14 5.85 6.22 -19.21
0.7 0.963 0.847 0.192 0.460 0.423 0.228 0.210 13.3 -5.14 4.61 5.33 -15.08
1.0340 0.5 1.201 1.347 0.207 0.413 0.674 0.176 0.287 8.8 -16.50 5.91 13.32 -35.73
0.6 1.211 1.294 0.198 0.436 0.647 0.180 0.267 9.8 #-13.04 5.08 12.04 -30.16
0.7 1.164 1.244 0.191 0.458 0.622 0.184 0.250 10.7 #-9.59 4.01 10.03 -23.63
The equivalent variation is reported as a % of the individual’s expected present value of lifetime income.
SSE: Social Security expenditure (as % of gross domestic output).
#: unbounded support of the long-run laissez-faire equilibrium.
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in the equilibrium wealth distribution. The strength of the bequest motive used to
generate Table 1, γ = 0.25, suggests an ex ante welfare gain of 0.64%. To put this
number in perspective, the remainder discusses the relative importance of insurance
and the strength of the transfer motive.
5.2.1 Disentangling insurance
In the current setup, the scheme provides only transfer insurance and the induced ex
ante insurance manifested in a more concentrated long-run wealth distribution.21 To
quantify the relative importance of both forms of insurance, the overall welfare effect is
split into effects stemming from the reduction in wealth, transfer insurance, and ex ante
insurance of the state at birth, respectively. First, the average willingness to pay for
transfer insurance is calculated as follows. Suppose that each individual j in the laissez-
faire equilibrium enjoys unchanged initial wealth, but also bequest insurance through
the possibility of annuitization by means of the scheme. Denote the associated welfare
number by φ1 =
∫
φj1dj. Since the inital wealth distribution is unaltered by the scheme,
the transfer insurance effect coincides with the short-run welfare effect from the scheme.
While the smoothing of transfers across states is beneficial to risk-averse individuals,
an increase in the probability of surviving into old age reduces the gains from transfer
insurance. At the extreme, q = 0 implies that the contribution to the scheme is a
perfect substitute for private savings in physical capital (as in Barro (1974)) and such
gains vanish. Second, consider the ex ante risk of being born into a particular state.
The average percentage increase in initial wealth necessary to make the individuals in
the laissez faire equilibrium as well off as they would be if they were faced with the ex
ante expected initial wealth position, φj2, solves V (φ
j
2(w + b
j
t)) = V (
∫
(w + bjt)dj). If
transfers are motivated by the joy of giving, then individuals do not (fully) take into
account the scheme’s impact on future generations well-being, thereby also generating
an externality in the form of wealth reduction. This effect is obtained as the residual
φ3 = φ− φ1 − φ2.
The overall welfare gain is decreasing in the market rate of return. For modest real
rate of returns, transfer insurance considerably dominates ex ante insurance. However,
since bequests are transferred with interest, an increase in R increases the spread
in the long-run wealth distribution, so that ex ante insurance becomes increasingly
important. Consider, again, the benchmark constellation (1 − q, R) = (0.7, 1.0340),
in which case the support of the laissez-faire equilibrium distribution is unbounded,
and the contribution of ex ante insurance to the overall welfare effect is 2.5 times
the contribution of transfer insurance. However, the increase in R also enhances the
reduction in capital and wealth, which is the far most important contributor to the
overall effect if R is high.
By virtue of Lemma 6 the overall propensity to save with the scheme is higher than
without it whenever σ < 1. To illustrate what happens in this range, Table C.2 repli-
21The model setup is unambiguous at this point: the two period assumption implies that the annuity
is only paid once, excluding the insurance of longevity risk (i.e. the risk of running out of resources).
Recalling footnote 6, insurance of lifetime risk itself is also excluded.
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cates the allocative and welfare consequences of the scheme for 0.5, which corresponds
to a relatively high intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 2. The increase in long-
run capital induced by the scheme now goes along with a long-run reduction in welfare;
for the ex ante insurance is significantly reduced (for the unproductive panel, the ratio
of ex ante insurance bequest insurance gains is 0.062, compared to 0.28 in the case
where σ = 2).
5.2.2 Welfare gains and the strength of the bequest motive
Presuming R = 1, Figure B.3 illustrates that the welfare consequences of the scheme
depend qualitatively on the strength of the bequest motive. The red line is the net
welfare effect as a function of the strength of the bequest motive. While altruists gain
far less than egoistists from the scheme, the crowding out induced by the scheme is
compatible with long-run welfare gains as long as the strength of the transfer motive
is low, although the reduction in transfer wealth is quite substantial. However, overall
welfare gains turn into losses if the transfer motive is strong enough: while egoists (i.e.
γ = 0) gain on average 3.29% of their expected lifetime income, individuals who value
inter vivos transfers and old-age consumption alike (i.e. γ = 1) suffer from a modest
average welfare loss of about -0.1% of expected lifetime income. The driving forces are
transfer insurance (in the egoistic economy, a higher effective rate of return) and the
crowding out of wealth. Both effects are decreasing in γ. Since R = 1, the laissez-faire
equilibrium distribution is bounded (see Proposition 3), such that ex ante insurance is
relatively insensitive to the strength of of the bequest motive. While ex ante insurance
plays a minor role, it may tip the scales in qualitative evaluations of overall welfare
consequences from Social Security pensions.
5.2.3 Long-run welfare consequences: the egoistic economy
Welfare effects crucially depend on whether the transfer motive is operative. Table
C.1 provides the welfare numbers for the egoistic economy. Individuals save purely
out of perfect selfishness. However, the scheme entails an increase in the effective rate
of return, inducing standard income and substitution effects. The latter are bundled
in the number φ1 (equivalently, in the first bar for egoistic individuals in Figure B.3).
Not surprisingly, φ1 is decreasing in the probability of surviving into old age; for the
effective rate of return is decreasing in (1 − q). If capital is unproductive, then, on
average, the income effect stemming from the higher return is of the same size in
absolute value as the income effect stemming from the elimination of bequests. In the
benchmark 1 − q = 0.7, the remaining substitution effect falls short of the ex ante
insurance effect: 11.76− 10.53 = 1.23 < 2.06. As noted above, egoists gain much more
from the scheme than their altruistic counterparts. At first glance, one might argue
that the optimal scheme and the associated welfare gains are smaller in size; for the
bequest motive reduces the optimal degree of annuitization. By virtue of Corollary
2, however, the long-run optimal contribution rate in the altruistic economy coincides
with the one obtained in the egoistic economy if capital is unproductive. Given the
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insensitiveness of ex ante insurance to γ, the increase in the effective rate of return is
much more valued by egoists than bequests insurance is valued by altruists.
6 Conclusions
The paper analyzed the consequences from insuring mortality risk by means of stan-
dard fully funded Social Security Pensions in two socio-economic setups: an egoistic
economy in which individuals save out of a pure life-cycle motive, and an altruistic
economy in which individuals save out of both a life-cycle motive and an altruistic mo-
tive which reflects the joy of giving. In the former setup, the pension system promises
a higher effective return than the market. In the latter setup, the pension system is an
instrument to smooth intergenerational transfers across the states death and survival.
Whatever the individuals’ attitudes towards their heirs, the pension system reduces
intergenerational transfers, resulting in a lower but more concentrated distribution of
lifetime income in the long-run.
Altruistic behaviour is commonly seen to reduce the fraction of lifetime income to
be optimally annuitized. Given an equality of the market interest rate and the pop-
ulation growth rate, our model implies that, once the reduction in intergenerational
transfer is taken into account, the long-run optimal contribution rate is independent
of the strength of the transfer motive, and coincides with the one associated with the
egoistic economy. If capital is productive, then the pension system’s long-run optimal
contribution rate is even higher if individuals are altruistic, reflecting the desire to
make transfers to the heir.
The short-run welfare effects are clear-cut. Egoists gain from the higher effective
rate of return, while altruists gain from transfer insurance. The long-run welfare con-
sequences are not that obvious a priori. While the pension system reduces intergener-
ational transfers, it also reduces the mortality-related ex ante risk of being born with
a particular amount of wealth. The model suggests that, once ex ante insurance is
taken into account, fully funded Social Security Pensions can not be rejected a priori:
if capital is not too productive and the bequest motive is not too strong, then the
scheme generates long-run welfare gains; for insurance gains outweigh the crowding
out of within-family transfers.
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A Equivalent variation
The consumption-transfer allocation under laissez-faire, namely,
cj,0t = (1− a¯)(w + b
j
t) (A.1)
bj,0t+1 =
γ1/σ
1 + γ1/σ
Ra¯(w + bjt) (A.2)
bj,1t+1 = Ra¯(w + b
j
t) (A.3)
c0t+1 =
1
1 + γ1/σ
Ra¯(w + bt) (A.4)
gives the indirect utility of individual j born in period t as
V jt (0) = v¯(w + b
j
t)
1−σ, (A.5)
where
v¯ =
[
(1− a¯)1−σ + β (a¯R)1−σ (1− q)
(
(1 + γ1/σ)σ + q/(1− q)γ
)]
/(1− σ), (A.6)
which approaches (1− a¯e)
1−σ
(
1 + (β(1− q)R1−σ)
1/σ
)
/(1− σ) as γ → 0.
With the scheme, the consumption-transfer allocation
c0t = (1− s¯(τ
∗))(w + bt) (A.7)
b0t+1 = b
s
t+1 = Ra¯(τ
∗)(w + bt) = atR (A.8)
c0t+1 = γ
−1/σRa¯(τ ∗)(w + bt) (A.9)
gives the indirect utility of a member of the generation born in t as
Vt(τ
∗) = v¯(τ ∗)(w + bt)
1−σ, (A.10)
where
v¯(τ ∗) =
[
(1− s¯(τ ∗))1−σ + β(1− q)
(
a¯(τ ∗)R/γ1/σ
)1−σ
+ βγ (a¯(τ ∗)R)1−σ
]
/(1− σ),
(A.11)
which approaches (1− τ ∗e )
1−σ
(
1 + (βR1−σ)
1/σ
(1− q)
)
/(1− σ) as γ → 0.
Recalling the definition of φj, the equivalent variation reads
φjt =
(
v¯(τ ∗)
v¯
) 1
1−σ
ω(τ ∗)/ωjt
w + bτt
w + bjt
. (A.12)
For the egoistic economy, the equivalent variation of an individual whose j previous,
consecutive forebears within the lineage died prematurely is given by
φj =
[
1 + (β(1− q)R1−σ)
1/σ
1 + (1− q) (βR1−σ)1/σ
]
×
[
1 + (βR)1/σ
1 + (1− q) (βR)1/σ
] 1
1−σ
×
w
w + bj
, (A.13)
where w + bj = w
∑j
i=0 (a¯R)
i. Recalling that there are qj(1 − q) type-j individuals
in long-run equilibrium, the aggregate welfare effect stemming from the scheme is
φ =
∑
∞
j=0 q
j(1 − q)φj, where the double sum converges, provided that the long-run
equilibrium exists, i.e. a¯Rq < 1.
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B Plots
Figure B.1: Long-run distributions of lifetime income: the egostic economy
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The figure illustrates the distributions of lifetime income in the stationary equilibrium with (black bars) and without the scheme (blue
bars). The algorithm used to produce the figure is discussed in Section 5. The parameters are q = 0.5, β = 0.5, σ = 2, R = 1.0240,
w = 1.
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Figure B.2: Long-run distributions of lifetime income: the altruistic economy
The figure illustrates the distributions of lifetime income in the stationary equilibrium of the altruistic economy in the absence of the
scheme. The algorithm used to produce the figure is discussed in Section 5. The parameters are q = 0.5, β = 0.5, σ = 2, γ = 0.25,
R = 1.0240, w = 1.
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Figure B.3: Population average equivalent variation as a function of the strength of
the Transfer motive
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The figure illustrates the welfare consequences of the optimal scheme for different values of γ when capital is unproductive, i.e. R = 1.
The red line is the net effect. The bars represent a decomposition of the equivalent variation into bequest insurance, ex ante insurance
and crowding out of wealth. The first bundle of bars (on the far left) represents the decomposition of the equivalent variation for the
egoistic economy (i.e. ν(·) = 0) into (i) income and substitution effects induced by an increase in the effective rate of return, (ii) ex ante
insurance and (iii) capital reduction. The parameters use are R = 1, q = 0.3, β = 0.35, σ = 2.
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C Tables
Table C.1: Long-Run Welfare Effects in the Egoistic Economy
σ R (1-q) φ− 1 φ1 − 1 φ2 − 1 φ3 − 1
2 1.0040 0.5 4.58 19.81 2.30 -17.53
0.6 4.04 15.83 2.30 -14.09
0.7 3.29 11.76 2.06 -10.53
1.0140 0.5 -1.57 16.82 3.94 -22.33
0.6 -0.68 13.55 3.89 -18.11
0.7 0.09 10.14 3.44 -13.66
1.0240 0.5 -7.60 14.23 6.72 -28.55
0.6 -5.30 11.54 6.49 -23.32
0.7 -3.40 8.69 5.64 -17.72
1.0340 0.5 -13.44 12.02 11.46 -36.91
0.6 -9.74 9.79 10.77 -30.30
0.7 -6.57 7.42 9.14 -23.12
0.5 1.0040 0.5 1.48 2.97 0.02 -1.52
0.6 1.17 2.82 0.04 -1.68
0.7 0.85 2.43 0.06 -1.64
1.0140 0.5 1.11 4.36 0.11 -3.36
0.6 0.60 4.11 0.20 -3.70
0.7 0.23 3.52 0.30 -3.58
1.0240 0.5 -0.56 6.33 0.50 -7.39
0.6 -1.26 5.92 0.89 -8.07
0.7 -1.47 5.02 1.27 -7.75
1.0340 0.5 -4.83 9.08 2.32 -16.24
0.6 -5.29 8.38 3.96 -17.64
0.7 -4.62 7.02 5.29 -16.92
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Table C.2: Laissez-faire and the optimal scheme: long-run (average) allocation and welfare effects (in %), γ = 0.25, σ = 0.5
R (1-q) c∗t c
∗
t+1 a
∗
t s
∗
t b
∗
t+1 K/Y b/Y SSE φ− 1 φ1 − 1 φ2 − 1 φ3 − 1
τ = 0
1.0040 0.5 0.977 0.046 0.049 0.026 0.047 0.025
0.6 0.965 0.128 0.061 0.026 0.058 0.024
0.7 0.950 0.153 0.074 0.024 0.069 0.022
1.0140 0.5 0.984 0.103 0.074 0.058 0.066 0.052
0.6 0.966 0.128 0.091 0.057 0.080 0.051
0.7 0.944 0.153 0.109 0.053 0.094 0.046
1.0240 0.5 1.018 0.235 0.113 0.131 0.090 0.105
0.6 0.991 0.288 0.138 0.130 0.106 0.099
0.7 0.955 0.341 0.164 0.118 0.120 0.087
1.0340 0.5 1.134 0.571 0.186 0.320 0.116 0.200
0.6 1.087 0.689 0.224 0.312 0.130 0.180
0.7 1.021 0.795 0.259 0.280 0.141 0.152
τ = τ ∗
1.0040 0.5 0.942 0.115 0.007 0.065 0.007 0.061 0.007 5.42 -0.00 1.78 0.05 -1.84
0.6 0.932 0.114 0.007 0.076 0.007 0.070 0.007 6.37 -0.10 1.69 0.07 -1.86
0.7 0.921 0.113 0.007 0.086 0.007 0.079 0.007 7.27 -0.13 1.46 0.09 -1.68
1.0140 0.5 0.921 0.250 0.011 0.095 0.016 0.083 0.014 7.36 -1.25 2.59 0.24 -4.08
0.6 0.906 0.246 0.010 0.110 0.015 0.094 0.013 8.52 -1.30 2.44 0.34 -4.07
0.7 0.891 0.242 0.010 0.124 0.015 0.105 0.013 9.61 -1.17 2.09 0.41 -3.68
1.0240 0.5 0.897 0.536 0.015 0.137 0.034 0.105 0.026 9.32 -4.21 3.71 1.11 -9.03
0.6 0.876 0.523 0.015 0.157 0.033 0.117 0.024 10.56 -3.98 3.47 1.51 -8.96
0.7 0.856 0.511 0.014 0.176 0.032 0.127 0.023 11.67 -3.34 2.96 1.75 -8.05
1.0340 0.5 0.875 1.140 0.022 0.197 0.071 0.120 0.043 10.65 -10.14 5.23 5.25 -20.63
0.6 0.845 1.102 0.021 0.224 0.069 0.129 0.040 11.71 -8.88 4.85 6.66 -20.38
0.7 0.818 1.066 0.020 0.269 0.067 0.137 0.037 12.62 #-6.99 4.08 7.21 -18.28
The equivalent variation is reported as a % of the individual’s expected present value of lifetime income.
SSE: Social Security expenditure (as % of gross domestic output).
#: unbounded support of the long-run laissez-faire equilibrium.
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